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I The Wage Structure and the Systelll of Wages 
based on Seniority!) 
1 The hnportance of the Problem of the Wage System in Japan 
Wages should always be understood within the context of the mu-
tually-opposing relations between labour and management. The wage 
level, the wage system, which is a device for wage payment, and even 
the wage differentials and the type of labour market cannot be under-
stood properly until they are grasped in the context of the antagonistic 
relations between labour and management. 
Trade unions in Japan have long paid attention only to the low level 
of wages, and always exerted their efforts to raise it, but they have failed 
to notice that these low wages originate in a Japanese system of wages 
* Professor of Economics, Kyoto University. 
1) Wages detennined by enterprise-wide seniority order. 
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based on seniority. 
Recently, however, some of the trade unions have finally begun to 
take notice of this and have come to concentrate their efforts on rectifying 
{)r overthrowing the system of wages based on seniority. However, the 
General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (S6hy6), still looking upon the 
problem of the wage system as a taboo, concerns itself only with large-
scale wage increases. 
Why is the problem of the wage system so important? It is because 
this is a device for wage payment which reflects the structure of deter-
mining wages and the wage level is settled through this system, and 
because the interests of labour and management sharply conflict with 
·each other under this system. Capitalists as much as possible aim at 
minimizing the total sum of wages to be paid, by means of a wage system 
which will block the unification of labourers, while trade unions aim at 
protecting the wage level as far as they can, and at the realization of a 
wage system which will enable them to strengthen the unity of labourers. 
One can see that the Japanese seniority wage system is suited to the 
{)bjectives of capital, while horizontal wage rates, to wit, the principle 
·of "equal pay for equal work" seen in Europe and America, are a wage 
system suited to the objectives of the trade unions. And, these wage 
;systems were brought into being, respectively, in the course of rivalry 
between labour and management. 
2 The Wage Structure and Seniority Wages in Japan 
The wage structure is that of wage differentials so long as it reflects 
the mechanism of determining wages and a wage system, wages based 
-on seniority are characteristic of the wage system in Japan. 
Seniority wages in Japan are as follows, when viewed statistically 
from the angle of the wage structure. 
Wage Differentials of Male Labourers both by Length of 
Continued. SeIVice and by Scale of Enterprise 
(0/'0 with less than I year of service taken as 100) 
Scale Less than 
Labourers I year 2 yrs S-9 yrs 10-14 yrs 20-29 yrs Over 30yrs 
Over 1,000 psns 100.0 
(¥ 14,526) 
112.0 176.2 232.9 305.5 349.8 
500-999 
" 




100.0 125.1 185.0 221.6 266.6 255.1 
(¥13,199) 
30 - 99 
" 
100.0 119.6 161.1 184.6 204.1 188.6 
( ¥14,016) 
10 - 29 
" 
100.0 110.0 139.9 152.9 164.6 151.4 
(¥14,144) 
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Office Workers 
Over 1,000 psns 100.0 126.7 185.4 238.8 348.7 371.7 
(¥ 16,863) 
500-999 /I 100.0 132.5 180.6 229.8 310.3 340.3 
(¥ 17.078) 
100-449 /I 100.0 124.0 171.4 215.7 269.8 274.2 
(¥17,S43) 
30 - 99 /I 100.0 117.7 155.9 IS6.6 225.2 216.1 
(¥19,045) 
10 - 29 /I 100.0 115.2 142.9 163.5 17S.6 177,1 
(¥IS,294) 
Notes: Ministry of Labour, A General Survey of the Actual Wage Situation, 
April, 1961. 
The wage represents the average monthly wage paid in cash. 
Apr. ¥ I,OOO~£ 1. 
When this is compared with the wage structures of Europe and 
America, one finds that the Japanese wage structure is characterized by 
big wage differentials both in relation to length of service and in relation 
to the size of enterprises. These differentials exist even among workers 
doing identical types of work. In other words, in Japan no wage rates 
extend beyond the framework of the enterprises. In contrast, horizontal 
wage rates are found in Europe and America and wage differentials among 
different sizes of enterprises are entirely out of the question. 
In Europe today, under full employment, wage bargaining exists be-
tween labour and management within each enterprise21, As a result, wa-
ges are" intra-enterprise wages "3) (i.e., they vary from company to com-
pany) rather than" horizontal wages" (identical pay for identical work). 
Recently, intra-enterprise wages higher than the horizontal wage rate 
of the West have begun to be discussed in terms of the wage drift'). 
These intra-enterprise wage bargainings and the intra-enterprise wage 
system do have the effect of weakening the solidarity of trade unions. It 
is from this angle that the problem of wages must be studied. 
As can be inferred, wages based on seniority are intra-enterprise 
personal wages. A worker first begins with a starting wage which guaran-
tees him only a bare subsistence, modified somewhat by his educational 
background. His wage is increased on the basis of the length of his 
2) Reference is made to the following literature: A. Ross, II The New Industrial Relation 
in Britain ", Labour Law Journal, July 1962 j do, .. Prosperity and Labour Relations in Europe 
-The Case of West Gennany", Tilt Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1962; do, "Pros-
perity and Labour Relations in Europe-Italy and France ", Industrial and Lahour Relations 
Review, October 1962; B. C. Roberts, Industrial Relations, 1962. 
3) Reference is made to the following literature: S. W. Larner, .. Factory Agreement and 
National Bargaining in the British Engineering Industry ". Intunal;onal Labour Review, Jan-
uary 1964; D. J. Robertson, Factory Wage Structures and National Agreements, 1960, 
4) Reference is made to the following literature: E. H. Phelps Brown, .. Wage Drift", 
Economica, November 1962. 
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servlce, the degree of his contribution to the enterprise and the appraisal 
of his job records. The statistical table given above wage shows only 
the wage increase curves, which were obtained by averaging the curves 
of wage increases according to educational backgrounds, types of employ-
ment (normal employment of new graduates, intermediate employment, 
regular or temporary employment, local employment or employment at 
head offices, etc.) and individual factors. Wages for those with the same 
educational background and length of service may differ according to 
merit appraisal, personal circumstances and so forth. They also may 
differ widely according to sex. In short, they are entirely personal wages. 
Thus, seniority wages represent not only a wage system under which 
wages increase according to length of service, but also a discriminatory 
wage system centering on the unbroken service of normal employees on 
the premise of their permanent employment. This is an intra-enterprise 
personal and discriminatory wage system under which distinctions are 
made according to whether workers are in normal employment or in 
intermediate employment, whether they are regular employees or temporary 
ones, and also according to their sex. Moreover, distinctions are made 
more strictly through closer evaluation of those enumerated above. 
In their original form in pre-war years, seniority wages were deter-
mined not through collective bargaining between labour and management, 
bu t one-sidedly by the capitalists who boycotted the trade unions. This 
has remained the same since the war. In the post-war period the capi-
talists have reorganized and strengthened the seniority wage system. The 
trade unions tacitly accept this system and fight only for wage increases 
rather than for a change in the wage system. 
3 Technical Skills and Seniority Wages 
Some deny that such seniority wages, which are personal ones involv-
ing an undue discrimination, exist in japan. One is the view that consid-
ers seniority wages in japan to reflect technical skills'). 
This view stresses that technical skills in japan in pre-war years 
were secret and personal skills acquired by experience. Furthermore, 
since these technical skills were introduced into japan from foreign coun-
tries by various individual enterprises, they were used only by one par-
ticular enterprise, and were not put into common use. Thus, because 
these secret skills were acquired through experience, wages in japan were 
based on experience judged in terms of seniority. Also, because such 
technical skills were limited as much as possible to one enterprise, wages 
in japan, in conformity with this, were intra-enterprise wages with no 
5) Masumi Tsuda, .. The Basic Structure of Japanese Labour Relations", The Musashi Univer-
sity Journal. May 1965. 
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horizontal character. 
However, it is not just in Japan that skill is acquired by experience. 
This is also the case in Europe and America. It is widely known that 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers CASE) in England provided for a five-
year apprenticeship as the qualification for a "skilled labourer" and did 
not bestow the qualification for" skilled labourer" on those who had not 
completed this apprenticeship. 
With the exception of those industries such as the spinning industry 
in which manual skill gave way at one stroke during the industrial re-
volution, in most large industries, such as the machine industries, the 
break-down of manual skills caused by technical development has been 
gradual and extended over a long period of time. In England, in those 
industries in which mass production was established in the twentieth 
century, manual skills finally disappeared. Even today manual skills 
are still needed in many machine industry factories and In these the 
number of all-round skilled workers is sometimes large. It was only 
because such manual skills were not completely absorbed by machines 
but retained in the hands of labourers that craft trade unions conld con-
tinue to have strong organization and influence. 
Next, in answer to the view that such technical skills are applicable 
only to particular enterprises and are not generally applicable in society, 
even the Japanese skill is no longer merely such manual skill as was 
applied in the industries of the manufacturing type. Such manual skill 
as was used in the industries of the manufacturing type or home industry 
was not applicable to the new industries placed under the mechanical 
system. It had to be reorganized through the "teaching of the Western 
industries ". 
And, even though individual enterprises introduced foreign techniques 
separately, these skills were always part of a general technical system 
and were objective in their technological character. Thus, they had 
social availability. The fact that the Japanese iron-workers moved so 
frequently during the period between the Meiji and Taisho eras (1890 
-1919) bears eloquent witness to that. According to a contemporary 
account, the movements of the iron-workers are slightly less than those 
of the spinning, textile and raw-silk workers, but, when compared with 
those in Europe and America, there seems to be a great amount of move-
ment. Many went from one factory to another. When business was 
prosperous and there was a lack of workers, they frivolously moved to 
other factories merely because of slight differences in wages. When busi-
ness became slack they moved back to bigger factories. 
Summary of Factory Surveys (1902) corroborates the fact that skilled 
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workers moved frequently" both in urban areas and in local areas where 
factories are concentrated, workers move in and out very frequently, and 
there are very few factories which do not suffer from a difficulty in get-
ting skilled workers". 
It is contradictory that skilled workers who were supposed to be 
employable only within a particular enterprise and whose technical skills 
are supposed to have no general applicability should have moved so 
frequently. It follows that the very social applicability involved in their skill 
prompted them to move frequently in pursuit of higher wages. 
Thus, seniority wages are in no sense wages commensurate with tech-
nical skill. They represent in all respects a system of undue discri-
minatory wages incommensurate with the quality of labour. Instead, 
they are based on educational backgrounds, number of years of continued 
service, type of employment, sex and other personal factors. 
4 Large Oligarchic Enterprises and Seniority Wages 
Another view contends that seniority wages in an intra-enterprise 
wage structure represent a general system of wages under monopoly 
capitalism. Kazuo Koike, who holds this view, states that the words 
" job" and" duty" need precise definitions. When a monopolistic enter-
prise has been formed, job types are analysed and subdivided into job 
duties and classified by enterprise. New job types are established for 
employees with new skills, who are then promoted. Skill is formed 
through long unbroken service with the same enterprise, and labour, in 
its quality, has come more or less to assume the character of the enter-
prise. In a word, the nature of this labour force has become enterprise 
minded and seniority centered. 
I feel that this view is incorrect. Job types became more and more 
specialized because of increased mechanization. However, at the same 
time, the high degree of training of the traditional-type craftsman, such 
as a clock-maker or shoe-maker, came to be rendered unnecessary by 
machines and the assembly line. Thus, in modern capitalistic enterprises, 
although a machine-operator performs a highly specialized job, one main-
ly needs a generalized type of knowledge, and only a minimum amount 
of specialized training and skill for operating the machines. The training 
required is generally much less than that of the traditional craftsman. 
While a traditional craftsman had to go through a long period of appren-
ticeship on the job, the modern machine operator can receive in public 
schools much of the general knowledge needed for working in a factory. 
While in the Meiji period both general knowledge and specialized train-
ing for factory jobs was provided in the factory under the auspices of a 
labour union, this general knowledge increasingly came to be provided 
CHARACTERISTICS OF LABOUR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN JAPAN (1) 39 
by national education. This tended to lessen the need for labour unions_ 
Thus we can see that among the duties of an enterprise, labour ge-
nerally not only came to be interchangeable, but even between oligarchical 
mass production enterprises as well, the scope for interchangeability ex-
panded. What produces the stratified order of duties imprinted with the 
character of enterprise seniority route of promotion from the low to high 
positions is not the difference in the quality of labour and in technical 
skills, but job-site management and labour management based on a rank 
and order were created by each enterprise. 
In a large oligarchic enterprise in which a small number of technical 
labourers and a large number of simple labourers are assembled, the simple 
labourers who can be interchanged are classified on the basis of the ma-
chines which they use and the extent of their contribution to the enter-
prise. Accordingly, there is no assurance anywhere that such a job will 
standardize itself beyond the framework of the enterprise, and, as a na-
tural result, the job will inevitably bear the character of the enterprise. 
Those employees who operate more costly machines, even though the 
labour involved is the same in quality as others, are rated by the enter-
prise as on a higher wage scale. Those jobs which have more workers 
classified under them are rated higher as ones whose contribution to the 
enterprise is greater. This is the case with whoever can perform the job. 
The quality of labour does not matter here. Those who climb up to the 
higher rank of job are the labourers who are more diligent and show 
higher fidelity to the enterprise than any other labourer. Here the enter-
prise evaluates and judges the labourers in terms of the employees to 
expend their labour competitively, thereby fostering their loyalty to the 
enterprise. 
Owing to the absence of the horizontal wage control by the trade 
unions, the objectives of the enterprise are attained with relative case. 
And if horizontal wage control did exist in an enterprise, the enterprise 
would try to destroy it, detach the members of the trade union from the 
union's control and change them into strongly enterprise-conscious employ-
ees. An" occupational" wage rate means a wage rate linked to a cer-
tain job. An occupational wage is nothing but that which is analysed 
and evaluated by the enterprise from the standpoint of the enterprise on 
the basis of its degree of contribution to the enterprise. The point at 
issue here is the enterprise's labour management under which those jobs 
which are little different in quality are organized into one group. 
5 Seniority Wages Represent a System of Low Wages 
The principle of "equal pay for equal work" is the basis of trade 
union solidarity, but the seniority wage system weakens this foundation 
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through undue discrimination in wages, by means of which the enterprise 
-concentrates its workers in a company trade union of strongly enterprise-
-conscious employees, and cautiously keeps this company union from chang-
ing into an independent union by means of the union-shop, in which union 
membership is bestowed only on company employees. 
In this sense, seniority wages represent a wage system under which 
the objectives of capital are attained to the full, and they also maintain 
a system of low wages. Thus it is a wage system which is most suited 
for the objectives of capital. 
Seniority wages represent a system of low wages because a starting 
wage based on subsistence for a single person is the basis of determining 
wages. It is well known that in Europe and America, starting wages are 
meant to be sufficient to support a family. The core of the problem of 
low wages in Japan lies in whether wages are to be determined on the 
basis of a single person's subsistence or on that of subsistence for a family, 
not in the apparent lowness of a wage level in yen as compared with 
wage levels in the West. 
Accordingly, the insistence by many trade unions today that Japanese 
wages parallel those in Europe would actually entail changing the basis 
of determining wages from a single person's wage to a family wage. 
This would necessitate broadening the wage determination structure be-
yond the framework of the enterprise, which in turn would entail staging 
continuous struggles against management in order to achieve this goal. 
As already stated above, seniority wages represent a wage system 
under which the low starting wage for a single person, taken as the start-
ing point, is appraised and increased little by little each year in propor-
tion to the rise in the cost of living. If seniority wages represented a 
wage system under which all workers were under permanent employment 
and their wages started with low wages which were sure to be increased 
in proportion to the rise in the cost of living, then this could not neces-
sarily be said to represent a low wage system. However, under the seni-
ority wage system, the number of those whose wages are always increased 
in proportion to the rise in the cost of living has gradually decreased, and 
the constitution of the labour force by age has become pyramid-typed and 
this pyramid-type constitution of labour force has been maintained by 
each enterprise. 
An increase in wages in proportion to the rise in the cost of living 
is, so to speak, to be regarded as a compensatory measure for the starting 
wage being a low single person's wage (in principle, an enterprise derives 
its labour force from new graduates). If wages represented subsistence 
for a family, there would be no need to increase them. Under the seni-
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ority wage system, however, those who have been evaluated as "low", 
"intermediate ", or "temporary" employees enjoy either none or only a 
little of this compensatory action for their low wages and, moreover, their 
number is very large. Therefore, seniority wages represent a low wage 
system. 
Thus, the system of seniority wages, a system of unduly discriminatory 
wages, represents a system of low wages and is in its nature the most 
capitalistic wage system. 
6 Seniority Wages Constitute the Foundation of Both Enterprise-
consciousness and the COlD.pany Union 
If seniority wages represented merely a system of low and discrimi-
natory wages, labourers would strongly oppose and resist it. In reality, 
however, they constitute the basis of labourers' employee-consciousness. 
Seniority wages represent a system of low wages, but at the same time 
they also represent a system of relatively high wages among a wide range 
of low wages. Very few small enterprises before the war had wage systems 
based on seniority but all small enterprises had low wages. Since the 
total number of workers in small enterprises was very large, employees 
in medium and large enterprises were paid higher wages than those in 
small enterprises through wage increases under the generally-established 
system of seniority wages. Under the seniority wage system, higher wages 
were paid in larger enterprises, so that here occurred large wage differen-
tials between enterprises of differing sizes. 
Under the seniority wage system, "intermediate" employees have 
a lower status than "regular" employees, so they have virtually no op-
portunity to change jobs or company. It follows that it is best for them 
to remain employed for a long period by the enterprise in which they 
are now working. Moreover, their wages are increased in proportion to 
the rise in the cost of living. In any event wage increases are guaranteed 
to them which are rarely received either by workers in big enterprises. 
It follows that here is born a sense of security and the fate of the enter-
prise is their own fate-a consciousness that an enterprise must exist before 
there can be labourers. The longer they continue to be employed and 
the more their wages increase, the stronger will be their enterprise-con-
sciousness. The stability of their employment (permanent employment) 
will strengthen their enterprise-consciousness. Thus, labourers whose 
enterprise-consciousness is low are those who are young and those who 
are discriminated against in employee merit rating 'or because of being 
classified as "intermediate" employees. However, there is still no change 
in the fact that they are paid higher wages than "temporary" workers 
or labourers in small enterprises. 
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In this way, seniority wages, while representing a system of low wages, 
produces employees who are strongly enterprise-conscious, and it stabilizes 
labour-management relations by virtue of their relatively high wages and 
permanent employment. In this respect as well, seniority wages represent 
a system of capitalistic wages which is suited to the objectives of capital. 
The wage-increase system, permanent employment and welfare facilities, 
which are all presupposed by the seniority system, are primarily conces-
sions made by capitalists for changing their workers into employees and 
for stabilizing labour-management relations. 
Before the war, in enterprises where seniority wages were established, 
trade unions either ceased to exist or changed into the company unions. 
After the war company unions became employee organizations. 
An intra-enterprise union is a union subordinate to the enterprise and 
not an independent trade union. This is a trade union whose backbone 
has been extracted by the capitalists-namely, a non-independent union. 
It sometimes happens that from this union a second union will be born 
during a labour dispute in order to strengthen their unity, and even 
powerful unions are no exception. 
7 Seniority Wages and Labour Effciency 
Under the seniority wage system which presupposes permanent employ-
ment and wage increases, the efficiency of labourers naturally drops. How-
ever, the efficiency of the Japanese labourers is not always low. As 
compared with that in advanced nations, their efficiency is not as low as 
the lowness of their wages. Their efficiency is high for their low wages. 
Then, what creates this high efficiency? It is the system of confidential 
personnel evaluation and appraisal of job records with discriminatory 
promotion-in other words, the Japanese system of wage control and la-
bour management. 
Seniority wages are discriminatory wages according to educational 
backgrounds, types of employment, length of unbroken service, sex and 
other personal factors and are not based on clear-cut duties or qualifica-
tions. In other words, they are not those in which specific duties (groups 
of them) are combined with specific wage rates. This suggests that 
the enterprise does not clearly grasp the duties at each job site; and 
that it also does not attempt to increase the efficiency of the labour-
ers through management over duties. This further tells that the jobs of 
workers are not clarified in terms of their scope and quantity, in other 
words, their work is not prescribed. 
The capitalistic method in Japan of guaranteeing and securing the 
efficiency of labour under such conditions was that of effecting discrimi-
natory wage increases and discriminatory promotion by means of con-
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fidential evaluation and personnel appraisal, thereby getting labourers to 
expend their labour competitively. Seeking greater wage increases and 
earlier promotion, labourers try to increase their individual output and, 
enduring evaluation and personnel appraisal, try to climb up the pyramid 
to higher posts. Those labourers who will not take part in a competitive 
expenditure of labour are not only evaluated low, but are also thrown 
out of the enterprise when an opportunity arises. 
This was the capitalistic way of securing the efficiency of labour 
under the seniority wage system. These relatively high wages paid among 
generally low wages in Japan were recovered sufficiently by the enterprise 
by means of this capitalistic method of securing efficiency through compe-
tition. 
However, there was naturally a limit to the control of efficiency 
through such discriminatory management. Managers in general could not 
but be incompetent. This was not because of their lack of abilities, but 
because for managers too educational backgrounds, seniority, obedience 
and diligence which were the prerequisites for higher wages. 
We shall be able to understand better the substance and function of the 
seniority wage system through a historical review of how it was formed. 
IT The Form.ation of the Seniority Wage System. 
and.;,;Trade Unions 
1 Trade Unions in the Early Days and the Open Labour Market 
The labour market in our country from the Meiji period to the middle 
of the First World War (1880-1918) was not a closed labour market like 
that of today but a horizontal one. There was so little permanent employ-
ment then that labourers, whether skilled or unskilled, moved. As a natu-
ral result, those trade unions in our country of skilled labourers who moved 
in a horizontal labour market, unlike the company unions of today, were all 
horizontal craft trade unions (the iron-workers' union, printers' union, etc.). 
The Iron-workers' Union was organized in December, 1897 with 1,184 
iron-workers moving on a horizontal labour market. In 1900 its members 
increased to 5,400. These members were mainly composed of workers in 
fundamental job types in army and navy arsenals and in big metal and 
machine industries, etc. They were reliable, first-class workers, who were 
advanced both in their techniques and in their experience and who were 
capable of performing many kinds of jobs. Iron-workers assembled in the 
Iron-workers' Union were the "Western iron-workers," who were skilled 
in the new techniques, so they had to be organized in a new manner. 
Those who were associated with conventional skills also had to be reor-
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ganized in a new manner. 
During the Meiji period, when the machine industry did not develop 
using workers who were already skilled but had to develop while nurturing 
the necessary skilled workers under difficult circumstances, skilled iron-
workers were always in short supply, and so they moved in pursuit of 
higher wages. That is why they were called" migratory workmen". 
Such being the situation, there were many trainees who moved even be-
fore completing their apprenticeship. It is said that those who finished 
their apprenticeship accounted only for one-third of the total. 
The Iron-workers' Union was a union of such migratory workers. It 
carried on activities such as mutual assistance; payment of allowances in 
case of disasters, diseases, death or fires; helping jobless members find 
employment; and mediating in disputes. But, unlike the Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers (ASE) in England, it had no power whatsoever to 
restrict the supply of skilled workers (apprenticeship control), nor did it 
have any intention or power directly or indirectly to control wages and 
working conditions. 
The skilled labourers of the Iron-workers' Union brought about stand-
ardization of wages through this labour movement during a period of 
labour shortage. This was not a conscious direction adopted by the 
Iron-workers' Union for the purpose of maintaining or improving the wage 
level, but a spontaneous movement. The Iron-workers' Union was a " friend-
ly society", a union organization devoted to harmony between capital 
and labour, and it had no conscious policy for wage standardization. 
The situation of the printers and the Printers' Union (founded in 
1899), was similar to that of the iron-workers and the Iron-workers' Union. 
Printers moved frequently and the activities of the Printers' Union exclu-
sively involved mutual aid and" mediation in disputes". The Rectifica-
tion Association (1898) organized by the locomotive engineers and firemen 
of the Japan Railway Company was the same. The Rectification Associa-
tion was a craft union of the locomotive engineers and firemen of the 
Japan Railway Company, but it was far from an intra-enterprise union 
such as we find today. 
These trade unions virtually collapsed under the Public Peace Police 
Law enacted in March 1900, but even after that there was no change 
seen in the moves of workers or the search for them. At this timc wages 
were not based on seniority, but were paid "on the basis of technical 
skill", based on " wages commensurate with technical abilities". The short-
age of the labour force was in no respect the result of the trade union's 
policy of restricting the supply of skilled workers. 
To cope with the moves of skilled labourers and their critical shortage, 
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military arsenals and other industries as early as 1877 inaugurated various 
systems, such as those of" fixed-term workers" or " monthly-paid workers" 
for whom the period of contract was fixed and to whom retirement allow-
ances were paid at the expiration of the period in unsuccessful efforts 
to keep skilled labourers. Such" fixed-term workers" also moved frequent-
ly. The system of compulsory workers' funds set up by each enterprise 
as a means of checking movements of the skilled labourers also proved of 
no avail. 
Among the policies carried out by enterprises to prevent movements 
of labour were those of encouraging unbroken service, bonuses, retirement 
allowances, distribution of profits in proportion to the number of years 
continued service, and promotion to supervisory posts of those who had 
served continuously for many years. However, these also turned out to be 
of no effect. 
2 Class Rivalry and the Budding of Labour Managel11ent 
The sharp increase in the demand for skilled workers caused by the 
Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) further aggravated the shortage of skill-
ed workers and intensified their movements. However, some 800,000 work-
ers lost their jobs due to the business depression after the war with the 
result that the supply of skilled labourers changed temporarily from short-
age to excess for the first time. At the same time there were new trends 
toward excessive concentration of the capital, formation of oligarchy, class 
confrontation and formation of a new labour-management relationship. 
Modern large-scale enterprises in Japan, with military arsenals and 
government factories as their nucleus, came to be operated by Japanese 
skilled labourers, engineers and managers who were gradually trained 
using Western machines and technical advisers. However, this was their 
first experience in managing a big enterprise and thus it took them a long 
time to acquire this ability. These military arsenals and big government 
factories trained, by themselves, the skilled workers which were needed. 
However, they could hardly meet the growing demand for skilled workers, 
and, as they had neither ability nor experience in managing job sites and 
labour, they were obliged to leave the training and procuring of skilled 
labourers, and their supervision and management to what were called the 
" master-workers" or workers of superior skill. 
As the managers of the big enterprises in those days did not have the 
necessary skills for performing job-site management and labour manage-
ment, they divided many phases of the process of production wherever 
possible and had" master-workers" do those jobs by contract under their 
indirect management. Meanwhile they concentrated their own efforts on 
the phases of funds and sales. This was the masters' system which charac-
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terized the machine industry during the period from the middle to the 
latter part of the Meiji era (1890-1912). These master-workers functioned 
as general supervisors over all labour affairs including the employee ma-
nagement (the recruitment and training of workers), operational manage-
ment (the planning and execution of production), and employee welfare 
management (taking care of the economic and mental lives of the workers). 
Labour conditions for probationary workers and unskilled labourers were 
left to the arbitrary decisions of the foremen and master-skilled workers 
under whom they worked. 
These master-workers were those who had developed from traditional 
workmen, migratory workers who had previously been trainees in the big 
enterprises, or workers of superior ability who had improved their skill by 
moving from enterprise to enterprise. Such skilled workers as lathemen, 
assemblers and finishers had to be newly trained, but such skilled workers 
as blacksmiths, can-makers, casters, wood-workers and painters who were 
associated with the old craftsman's manual skill could be acquired by re-
training already-existing workmen, in other words, by "instructing them 
in Western industrial methods", so that some had apprentices stemming 
from the traditional system of apprenticeship since the feudal age, though 
this" system of apprentices attached to workers" was found only rarely 
and virtually ceased to exist by 1910. 
On the other hand, one can realize that as long as master-workers 
performed all labour management on behalf of the managers, including 
the procurement and training of labourers and supervision over them, the 
new relations between the master skilled-worker and his workers were si-
milar to the traditional relations between a master and his followers. 
As long as work was contracted for by the master skilled-workers, the 
apprentices were exploited by them. Probationary workers and ordinary 
workers were also not free from intermediate exploitation, resulting fre-
quently in bribery and lax discipline at job-sites. 
However, such a masters' system was swiftly eliminated by capitalists, 
and all of the employment management, job-site management and labour 
management which the master skilled-workers had heretofore controlled 
came to be managed by the capitalists. Capitalists were able to do this 
because of the mechanization and rationalization pushed before and after 
the Russo-Japanese War. 
The foremen's system came to be formed under the direct control of 
the capitalists. While experiencing business depressions and the intensifica-
tion of the class confrontation, many big enterprises began to train skilled 
workers who until then had been trained mainly in some of the big military 
and government factories. At the same time some companies worked to 
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improve the well·being of the workers, establishing facilities such as com-
pany houses in order to give security to the workers. Those disturbances 
and disputes which broke out in many military arsenals, at big mines and 
big enterprises in the years 1905-1907 were partly caused by a rise in 
commodity prices, but at the same time they also reflected the resistance 
of the master skilled-workers who had been deprived of their positions 
through such a rationalization of the management system by the capitalists 
and the resistance of those labourers who came to be more severely ex-
ploited by means of this new method of labour control. 
The accumulation and concentration of capital after the Russo-Japanese 
War created oligarchical capital, but the resistance of the labourers aroused 
by the rationalization of the labour management and operational manage-
ment pushed by these large oligarchic enterprises gradually became organi-
zed and came to be staged on a large scale. Finally it gradually began 
to pose a threat to the state and to oligarchical capital. A mutual assistance 
association centering around the company and other welfare facilities aimed 
at decreasing such rivalry between labour and management, at preventing 
labour disputes, and at securing skilled labourers on a stable basis. The 
Factories Act enacted in 1911 indicated nothing but the state's socio-politi-
cal effort to decrease such antagonism between labour and management. 
As to the wages, meanwhile, there was not yet such a system of wage 
increase as seen today. Wages were mostly paid" on the basis of skill in 
job performance", and because workers could move from job to job, 
there was no significant difference in the wage scales of enterprises. 
The differentials among the wage scales of the enterprises noted in govern-
ment publications are as follows. 
Average Wage per diem in 1909 
Scale of Factory Amount Difference 
Over 1,000 persons ¥0.34 100.0 
500-999 /I 0.32 94.1 
100-499 /I 0.33 97.1 
50 - 99 /I 0.32 94.1 
30 - 49 /I 0.32 94.1 
10 - 29 /I 0.33 97.1 
4- 9 /I 0.34 100.0 
The business depression after the Russo-Japanese War produced a 
great number of unemployed and decreased the movements of labourers, 
while the number workers trained by enterprises increased. Capitalists 
were thus more easily able to recruit workers with the necessary skills. 
However, such a tendency of workers to settle down ended as a result of 
the out-break of the First World War. Owing especially to business prosperity 
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after the advent of 1916, workers came to move frequently again. 
3 The Friendly Society and the Gradual Awakening of Labourers 
The trade union movement virtually collapsed following the enactment 
of the Public Peace Police Law in 1900. It was replaced by a socialist 
movement led by a few intellectuals which achieved little beyond publiciz-
ing socialist ideas. The anarchistic idea of direct action advocated by 
Shiisui Kiitoku and others was one of the products of this movement. In 
1910, the socialist movement was completely wiped out as a result of its 
complete suppression after an unsucessful plot to assassinate the Meiji 
Emperor attempted by several anarchists (the Great Treason Incident). 
After this the influence of socialism on the labouring class was very weak. 
During the "Winter" of the socialist movement which followed the 
"Friendly Society" (Yiiaikai) was organized (on 1st August, 1912) by 
Bun ji Suzuki, a Christian, and fifteen others. Suzuki was the secretary 
of the United Christianity Propagation Society and had had no leading 
part in either the union movement or the socialist movement. 
The Friendly Society, as indicated by its name, was formed after the 
pattern of the Friendly Society under the Combination Act in England. 
It was an organization having as its objects mutual aid, friendship, cultiva-
tion, improvement of skill, entertainment and so forth. In this respect, it 
was the same as the trade unions of the Meiji period. 
Bunji Suzuki was a moderate and an advocate of labour-management 
cooperation who favoured social reform based on Christianity. He stressed 
the necessity of organizing trade unions as one means of improving the 
status of workers. 
The Friendly Society published an organ titled the "Friendly News-
paper" (first published on 3rd November, 1912 and renamed" Labour and 
Industry" on November, 1914). Suzuki wrote for every issue of it, em-
phasizing the need for the enlightenment and unification of workers. 
Suzuki wrote in his autobiography, I wanted to implant proper' self-
consciousness' in the labouring class in our country as early as possible. 
And, standing on this self-consciousness, I wanted to lead them in organiz-
ing solid, sound trade unions. This was the dearest wish of myself who 
was the president of the society as well as the editor of the newspaper 
a wish I never forgot even for a moment. The Friendly Society was to be 
the cradle, kindergarten and front-door for this. And it was enough for 
me to be the caretaker of the cradle, the dry-nurse of the kindergarten, 
and then the door-keeper"'). 
This aim and intention of Suzuki's, supported also by the democratic 
movement in the Taisho period, was attained to the full, and the Friendly 
6) Bunji Suzuki, Twenty Yea,s of lhe Labour Movemenl, pp. 81-2. 
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Society gradually grew into a full-scale trade union, until its name was 
changed to the Friendly Society of the Great-japan General Federation of 
Trade Unions in September, 1919 (the words' Friendly Society' were delet-
ed in 1920) and established, its position as a federation of craft trade unions. 
A great influence on the development of the Friendly Society was 
that in the disputes at the japan Gramophone Company in june, 1913 
and in those at the Tokyo Muslin Spinning Mill in june, 1914, Suzuki 
successfully mediated, settling the disputes to the advantage of the labourers. 
With the help of advisers who were eminent scholars or councillors and of 
his friends who were the members of the Friendly Society, he adopted a 
method for mediation of having them stand between the companies and 
him, which proved to be a great reason for his successes. Since there were 
very few labour organizations, the membership of the Friendly Society 
steadily increased, and in April, 1917, at the time of its fifth congress, 
it totalled 27,000. 
Branches of the Society were organized in various places, though 
these local branches were run by skilled workers of the foreman class 
and liberal intellectuals who helped them. Thus they were far from 
being run democratically by the average worker-members. 
Under such circumstances, however, the self-consciousness of the 
common members gradually deepened, and disputes staged mainly by them 
began to arise. These disputes were conducted peacefully with firm 
solidarity, ending in the fulfilment of their demands. 
After 1916 commodity prices rose sharply, with the result that spon-
taneous disputes increased and the Society'S members who took part in 
them also increased. However, the Friendly Society was never an insti-
gator of disputes. "The Friendly Society does not instigate strikes or 
assist in them without good reasons. Avoiding these means and employing 
peaceful methods wherever possible, the Society attempts to elevate the 
position of labourers and improve their living. Only in an unavoidable 
case, the Society will approve a strike as an inevitable means"'). 
Many of those disputes which thus took place were directed by office 
workers or by skilled labourers directly under them who belonged to the 
Society. 
At the convention marking the 5th anniversary of its founding (held 
in April, 1917) against such a background, its constitution was revised 
to read in part that "this Society shall be a general national federation 
of various organizations (whose members belong to the same occupation); 
however, its branches shall be of two kinds; craft and regional". ThuS' 
the Society made clear its intention to create craft trade unions. It 
7) Tetsu Nosaka, "The Noisy Beginning of the New Year", Labour and Industry, March 1912p 
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was decided at the same convention that women who were associate 
members of the Society would be made regular members, that conventions 
be held once a year and that only a regular member be entitled to 
be its president and that he be elected at a convention. It was further 
made clear there that its finances were to be based on members, dues 
thereby turning the Society which had thus far been under the virtual 
dictatorship of Bunji Suzuki into something like a trade union. 
4, The Developm.ent of the Union Movem.ent and the Form.ation 
of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Japan 
Owing to the presence of both eminent scholars in the capacity of 
the advisers of the Society and councillors, Bunji Suzuki's stand in favour 
of moderate social reform based on Christianity and the great emphasis 
he placed on such activities as education, self-cultivation and mutual as-
sistance, wherever there was an organization of the Society both managers 
and bureaucrats generally gave it positive support thus enabling the 
Society steadily to increase its influence. But, when strikes occurred fre-
quentlyat big companies in Tokyo and in other places in 1916 and 1917, 
the situation suddenly changed. Factory managers alleged that these 
strikes were incited by the Friendly Society, while the government and 
police autorities tended to look coldly upon the behaviour of the leaders 
and the rank and file of the Society. In February, 1917, the factory 
managers formed their own organization in an attempt to oppose the 
workers. This tendency to regard the Friendly Society with hostility 
became decisive on the occasion of the large-scale strike at the Japan 
Steel Mill at Muroran (in March, 1917), especially after its branch 
there was suppressed. 
In spite of Suzuki's statement that" we never stop urging the awak-
ening of labourers both in writing and in speaking, but we never have 
raised any disturbance where everything was peacefuL .... "Bl, the suppres-
sion of the Society spread to army and naval arsenals and even 
extended to the private enterprises, with the result that many members 
left the Society and a number of branches and sub-branches ceased to 
exist. 
Closely following the large-scale strike at the Japan Steel Mill at 
Muroran in March, 1917, there occurred big strikes at the Nagasaki 
Shipyard in June and at the Yokohama Dockyard and Asano Shipyard 
at the end of the year, marking an epoch in the history of strikes. In 
coping with this, the government and police authorities further intensified 
their suppression of the Friendly Society and made greater efforts to 
8) Bunji Suzuki, "Listen, the Capitalists I ", Labour and Industry. June 1917. 
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undermine its solidarity, and the police carefully investigated into the 
background of the staff-members of the Friendly Society's headquarters 
and local branches. However, encouraged by such developments as Taisho 
period democracy, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Rice Riots of 
1918, the Friendly Society developed sufficiently to be associated with the 
formation of a general labour federation. 
The suppression of 1917 advanced the formation of craft union bran-
ches based upon the 1917 revised regulations. Meanwhile a great change 
took place inside the Society itself due to old members leaving the So-
ciety and new members joining it. Old members who were simple co-
operativists or who lacked class-consciousness left the Society under the 
influence of the suppression, and self-conscious, militant labourers joined 
it, organizing new branches or maintaining those branches which already 
existed. 
At the Friendly Society's Sixth Congress held in Osaka in April, 1919, 
new leaders from the skilled worker class were predominant. At this 
Congress bills were introduced by the branch unions in an attempt to 
transform these branches into the carft unions. This showed that the 
workers belonging to the branches had started to grapple with the pro-
blem of the improvement of workers' economic conditions. 
The part the I. L. O. played in the awakening of the labourers was 
also important. From January, 1919, labour issues were among those 
taken up at the Paris Peace Conferences and in April it was decided that 
an International Labour Organization and a nine-article charter for labour 
be written into the peace treaty. Since the Friendly Society sent Bunji 
Suzuki to the Conference as a representative from Japan, it took a great 
interest in it, and the headquarters of the Friendly Society publicized 
this nine-point charter as the" Labourers' Magna Charta". After Jan-
uary, 1919 when labour issues were taken up in Paris, public opinion 
in Japan had seethed over the issues of official recognition of trade 
unions and the revision of Article 17 of the Public Peace Police Law 
which denied the right to unite. Against this background, the Friendly 
Society stressed that its nine-point charter listed the natural rights of 
workers. The demand for the freedom to unite was first initiated by the 
members of the Friendly Society in the Kansai district and then was 
spread to other districts. 
During 1919, 71 trade unions were organized and disputes totaled 492, 
in which 63,137 persons participated. This showed a great increase com-
pared with the number of disputes in previous years. The number of 
trade unions increased not only quantitatively, but also made qualitative 
strides as seen in the formation of the Kansai Allied Association. The 
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establishment of these independent unions as a substructure eliminated 
the system of unilateral leadership by a central headquarters. Independ-
ent workers' organizations now existed which guaranteed the independent 
operation of the system, and these could put forward demands such as 
freedom for trade unions, the right to strike, abolition of Article 17 of 
the Public Peace Police Law, an eight-hour day, a minimum wage 
system, labour insurance, and democratic factory organization. The 
nucleus of these organizations, whether in the Kansai or Kanto areas, 
were composed of union activists who were leading workers below the 
foremen class. 
The Friendly Society of Great Japan General Federation of Trade 
Unions was formed in September, 1919 on the basis of such democra-
tization and independence of the branches and the federation. At the 
Friendly Society's Seventh Congress from 31st August to 2nd September, 
1919, it was decided to rename the Society the Friendly Society of General 
Federation of Trade Unions of Great Japan, that power be taken away 
from the president and given to a board of directors, and that branch 
organizations be changed gradually from a regional to a craft basis, thus 
completing the trend toward their transformation into craft unions. Also, 
a resolution was made on twenty items to be won. Based on the nine-
point labour charter of the I. L. 0., these were: (1) that labour is not a 
commodity, (2) freedom for trade unions, (3) prohibition of child 
labour, (4) establishment of a minimum wage system, (5) establishment 
of an equal wage system for both sexes for labour of the same quality, 
(6) no work on Sundays, (7) an eight-hour day and a six day week, (8) 
prohibition of night work, (9) installation of supervisors over women's 
labour, (10) enforcement of labour insurance, (11) promulgation of a 
dispute arbitration law, (12) prevention of unemployment, (13) the 
same treatment for labourers at home and abroad, (14) improving 
workers housing and placing them under public management, (15) 
establishment of a labour indemnity system, (16) improvement of part-
time labour, (17) abolition of labour by contract, (18) universal suffrage, 
(19) revision of the Public Peace Police Law, and (20) democratization 
of the educational system. 
5 The Trade Union MovelDent and Managers' Counter-m.easures 
The successive occurrence of disputes and the development of the 
union movement not only incurred suppression by the capitalists, govern-
ment and police authorities, but also activated a move on the part of 
capitalists to resist the movement by means of the establishment of more 
welfare facilities and the formation of company unions. "As strikes broke 
one after another in various places, intervention by the capitalist class and 
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by the government and police authorities gradually increased. Some 
tried to interfere with the labour movement by means of happiness-
promoting facilities. Each factory tried to organize a workers' union in 
an attempt to cause its workers not to have their attention distracted else-
where"'). 
Bunji Suzuki also wrote about attempts by companies to prevent the 
development of true labour unions: "Among the many capitalists in the 
world there are some here and there who tried to be the first to improve 
their factory facilities, better the treatment of their workers, create 
an organization of their workers and labourers in a company or a 
factory at the proposition of the company itself, or organize an associa-
tion of reservists with all the ex-soldiers of a company with which com-
pletely to replace the labourers, stating that' as we are giving appropriate 
treatment to the labourers we are using here, we do not agree to the 
necessity for such an organization as the Friendly Society"lO). 
It was the intention of the capitalists to get rid of the trade unions 
and replace them with company unions, and to make labour-management 
relations paternalistic ones and reorganize them on a managing-family 
basis. 
Bun ji Suzuki criticised the theory of the paternalistic treatment of 
the workers by capitalists as hampering the labour movement. He stressed 
the necessity for trade unions to bring about good treatment for all work-
ers, instead of the good treatment towards the workers in certain indi-
vidual enterprises"). This was an utterance worthy of note, indeed. For, 
paternalistic labour-management relations and the seniority wage system 
came into being through the individual enterprises' good treatment to-
wards their workers and the exclusion of trade unions which attempted 
to improve the treatment of labourers as a whole. However, what was 
justly pointed out and criticised by Bunji Suzuki was not taken up and 
developed by the trade union movement. 
Neither the paternalistic good treatment towards workers by individual 
capitalists nor the creation of company unions could settle in their own 
enterprises those migratory-worker-typed skilled labourers who moved so 
frequently in those prosperous days after the First World War or eliminate 
the trade unions. 
The intensification of the union movement after the Rice Riots, with 
the year 1919 as a turning-point, made the order of the day not merely 
9) Labour and Industry, December 1917 . 
. 10) Bunji Suzuki, Labour Issues in Japan, p. 154. 
11) Bunji Suzuki, U Isn't It Necessary to Have Labour Organizations in the Companies and 
Factories Where the Workers are Well Treated? u, Labour and Industry, August 1917. 
54 E. KISHIMOTO 
paternalistic treatment towards workers by individual capitalists but also 
counter-measures against trade unions on the part of both the capitalists 
and the state. These were the establishment of the "Cooperative As-
sociation" in December, 1919 and the system of Labour Commissioners 
conceived by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the same year. 
The Cooperative Association's "purpose represents remedial action 
against the Rice Riots. The awakening of the general public has been deeper 
and deeper year after year. It will be impossible to eradicate the labour-
ers' unionism, however strictly it may be suppressed. Will it be impos-
sible to arrange some movement of such a type as will be free from the 
danger of opposition to the capitalists while satisfying the social and 
collective desires of labourers ...... ? This was the first plan that was made 
for the Cooperative Association after they had considered several alter-
natives"12). 
Bunji Suzuki, who was asked by Eiichi Fukuzawa to join as a trade 
union representative, refused to take part, explaining that the Coopera-
tive Association was being established to take the place of the trade un-
ions. He wrote an article titled" My Criticism of the Labour-Management 
Cooperative Association" for the January, 1920 issue of Labour and 
Industry, in which he made known his opposition to the Cooperative 
Association. One reason for his opposition was that the capitalists would 
have much power and the workers would have little, therefore, real 
cooperation would be impossible. "When cooperation is mentioned, it 
presupposes that the other party also should have equal power. How is 
real cooperation to be realized under present circumstances in which 
capitalists look upon labourers as subordinate to them, hardly recognizing 
their individuality? Prior to talking of cooperation, we should first solve 
the problem of fostering such real power as will make cooperation pos-
sible. It is an urgent matter to enact a Trade Union Law for that pur-
pose. No matter how vigorously the Cooperative Association may wield 
cooperativism, it will not attain results so long as it neglect this urgent 
matter ...... Another reason he opposed it was that the funds of the Co-
operative Association were all to be donated by capitalists. "I wonder if 
it will be possible for it to retain true fairness, when the Association 
depends on the capitalists for its funds ... " Finally he opposed it as 
organization which would replace trade unions. "The founding of the 
Cooperative Association was motivated by their attempt to make it a 
substitute organ for the trade unions. In other words, they attempted 
to organize a paternalistic relief organization. "The promoters are repeat-
12) Bunji Suzuki, Twenty Years of the Labour Movements, p. 88. 
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edly explaining that it would never oppress trade unions, but they are 
not trustworthy. For example, concerning the problem of official recogni-
tion of trade unions, they look at it quite abstractly and thus avoid touch-
ing on it at all, don't they?" 
Suzuki states that" he who attempts to judge labour issues in terms 
of moral relations like the paternalism between master and servant rather 
than in terms of rights will be mocked by men of intelligence. It is a 
great anachronism to try to deal with labour-management problems on 
the basis of (Japanese) ethics when the labour issues are going to be 
considered outside (JapanJ on an international basis "1lI). We can say 
that this criticism by Suzuki was truly correct, when we think of the 
fact that the Cooperative Association was set up through inquiries made 
to the Japan Industrial Club by the then Home Minister, Takejiro To-
konami, who said, "so long as there are the time-honoured master-ser-
vant relations or paternalistic employment relations in Japan, we need 
not go to the trouble of licking the leavings of Europe and America if 
we make the clever use of that fine custom". 
The Home Ministry's idea concerning the Labour Commission was 
also to get rid of the trade unions and substitute it for them. 
(To be concluded in The Kyoto University Economic Review, Vol. 36, No.1, April 1966.) 
13) Ibid .• pp. 195-7. 
